The framework: PSD2, SCA, and EMV 3-D Secure
PSD2 requires strong customer authentication (SCA: two factors out of knowledge, possession, and inherence) for electronic payments initiated by the payer in the EEA. EMV 3-D Secure (3DS2), specified by EMVCo, is the protocol that delivers it for cards. It carries transaction and device data to the issuer, which decides whether to authenticate silently (frictionless) or to require a challenge.
Frictionless vs. challenge
In the frictionless flow, the ACS assesses risk using only the data it receives (AReq) and authenticates without any interaction. The cardholder sees nothing. In the challenge flow, the ACS requires an interaction, now mostly an approval in the banking app (possession of the phone plus a PIN or biometrics, which meets SCA). SMS OTP on its own has been dropped because it counts as only one factor.
| transStatus | Meaning | Next step |
|---|---|---|
Y | Authentication successful (frictionless or after a challenge) | Authorize with CAVV + ECI 05 (Visa) / 02 (MC); issuer liability |
A | Attempt: the ACS could not authenticate, but the scheme attests to the attempt | Authorize with ECI 06/01; liability shift retained in most cases |
C | Challenge required | Present the challenge (CReq/CRes), then resume the flow |
N | Not authenticated / failed | Do not authorize: decline almost certain, and no liability shift |
U | Authentication unavailable (ACS down, etc.) | Decide based on risk policy: retry, authorize without it (outside the EEA), or decline |
R | Rejected by the issuer (do not retry) | Abandon: the issuer refuses any authentication of this transaction |
Transmitted data: what drives frictionless
The 3DS2 AReq is the message the merchant uses to submit a transaction for authentication; the Directory Server then routes it to the issuer’s ACS. It can carry around 130 fields, about 100 of them mandatory or conditional and several dozen optional. That is the big difference from 3DS1. The more fields the merchant fills in, the more the ACS has to refine its score, and the more likely a frictionless outcome becomes. The fields fall into the following categories.
- Browser device data (mandatory in browser flows):
browserUserAgent,browserLanguage,browserScreenWidth/Height,browserTZ,browserJavaEnabled,browserAcceptHeader, IP address; - SDK device data (in-app flows): device identifiers, model, OS, jailbreak/root status; richer and more reliable than browser data;
- Transaction data: amount, currency, date, planned recurrence (
recurringFrequency,recurringExpiry); - Merchant risk indicators: shipping address,
shipIndicator(ship to billing address, in-store pickup, digital goods, etc.),deliveryTimeframe,reorderItemsInd(repeat purchase),preOrderPurchaseInd; - Cardholder account info: customer account age (
chAccAgeInd), date of last password change, number of transactions in the last 24 hours and the last year, number of saved cards; - Requestor data:
threeDSRequestorChallengeInd, which lets the merchant request a challenge (03), indicate that it prefers none (02), or signal that a mandate requires SCA (04).
{
"threeDSRequestorAuthenticationInd": "01", // 01 = payment (vs. card enrollment)
"threeDSRequestorChallengeInd": "02", // 02 = no challenge requested
"acctNumber": "4895370000000000", // PAN or DPAN
"purchaseAmount": "8990", "purchaseCurrency": "978", // EUR 89.90 (ISO 4217)
"browserIP": "92.184.100.23",
"browserUserAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_5...)",
"browserLanguage": "fr-FR", "browserTZ": "-120",
"browserScreenWidth": "390", "browserScreenHeight": "844",
"cardholderName": "MARIE DUPONT",
"email": "marie.dupont@example.com",
"shipAddrCity": "Paris", "shipAddrPostCode": "75002", "shipAddrCountry": "250",
"merchantRiskIndicator": {
"shipIndicator": "01", // ship to billing address
"deliveryTimeframe": "03", // overnight delivery (within 24 hours)
"reorderItemsInd": "02" // reorder of a previously purchased item
},
"acctInfo": {
"chAccAgeInd": "05", // customer account created > 60 days ago
"nbPurchaseAccount": "11", // 11 purchases in the last 6 months
"suspiciousAccActivity": "01" // no suspicious activity observed
}
}
// Rich, consistent data -> low ACS risk score -> transStatus Y, no challenge.Liability shift: who bears the fraud loss?
A liability shift moves the cost of fraud from one party to the transaction to another. On unauthenticated card-not-present transactions, that cost falls on the merchant, in the form of a fraud chargeback. 3DS authentication shifts it to the issuer: a cardholder who disputes an authenticated transaction can no longer obtain a fraud chargeback. Non-fraud reasons, such as items not received or not as described, remain available in every case.
| Scenario | ECI (Visa/MC) | Fraud liability | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3DS successful (frictionless or challenge) | 05 / 02 | Issuer | Maximum protection against fraud chargebacks |
| Attempt (ACS unavailable) | 06 / 01 | Issuer (usually) | The scheme attests to the attempt; detailed rules vary by brand |
| Exemption requested by the acquirer (TRA, LVP) | 07 / 00 + exemption flag | Merchant/acquirer | The price of a smooth checkout: no SCA, no shift |
| Exemption applied by the issuer (issuer TRA) | 07 / 00 | Issuer | Best case: smooth checkout AND protection |
| MOTO | no 3DS | Merchant | Out of SCA scope; no protection |
| Properly linked MIT | no 3DS | Issuer if the initial CIT was authenticated | Proof of the mandate relies on network transaction linking |
| No 3DS, no exemption (EEA) | 07 / 00 | Merchant + likely decline | Soft decline expected: avoid this case |
SCA exemptions in detail
The RTS (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389) provide exemptions from SCA, which the acquirer requests in the authorization flow (or the issuer applies). Separately, some cases are out of scope and are not exemptions at all, such as MITs, MOTO, and one-leg-out transactions (one of the two banks outside the EEA). The distinction matters. An issuer can refuse an exemption requested from it, whereas an out-of-scope transaction is by definition not subject to the authentication requirement.
| Case | Legal basis | Conditions and thresholds | Fraud liability |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquirer TRA (Transaction Risk Analysis) | RTS Art. 18 | Acquirer’s card-not-present fraud rate: ≤ 0.13% → baskets up to €100; ≤ 0.06% → up to €250; ≤ 0.01% → up to €500 | Merchant/acquirer |
| Issuer TRA | RTS Art. 18 | Same thresholds, based on the issuer’s fraud rate; issuer decides, frictionless | Issuer |
| LVP (Low Value Payment) | RTS Art. 16 | Up to €30, with issuer counters: SCA required after 5 transactions in a row are exempted or €100 cumulative | Merchant/acquirer if requested by the acquirer |
| Trusted beneficiaries (whitelisting) | RTS Art. 13 | The cardholder adds the merchant to a trusted list with its issuer (during a challenge); later transactions are exempt | Issuer |
| Secure corporate payments | RTS Art. 17 | Lodged cards, virtual cards, or dedicated corporate processes (business travel, etc.) using secure protocols | Issuer (through dedicated processes) |
| MIT | Out of SCA scope | Mandate set up by an authenticated initial CIT + correct network linking | Issuer, if linking is valid |
| MOTO (Mail Order / Telephone Order) | Out of scope (not an electronic payment under PSD2) | Mail or phone order, secure manual key entry | Merchant |
| One-leg-out | Outside territorial scope | Issuer or acquirer outside the EEA: SCA on a best-effort basis | Standard scheme rules apply |
| Anonymous prepaid | Out of scope (PSD2 Art. 63) | Anonymous gift cards up to €150 | Scheme rules apply |
1A/65) requiring SCA, even on a €15 basket. Exemption approval rates vary widely between issuers, from 50% to 95% for acquirer TRA. An exemption strategy is therefore managed issuer by issuer, based on observed rates.The applicable TRA threshold depends on the fraud rate of the acquirer (for acquirer TRA), calculated quarterly under the RTS methodology. A merchant with a low fraud rate is still capped by the overall rate of its acquirer’s portfolio. The fraud levels of other merchants in that portfolio therefore set the exemption ceiling available to it, which affects the choice of acquirer and how MIDs are segmented.
Soft declines and exemption strategy
A soft decline is a recoverable decline by which the issuer requires authentication: code `1A` at Visa (Additional customer authentication required) and `65` at Mastercard, repurposed for this use under PSD2. It tells the merchant that the transaction can go through if resubmitted with 3DS. Every European payment flow must implement this resubmission loop.
| Strategy | Conversion | Fraud and chargebacks | Liability | Best for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Full 3DS, challenges accepted | Lowest (5–15% challenge abandonment) | Minimal | Issuer on almost everything | High-fraud sectors (ticketing, resalable electronics), large baskets |
| 3DS on every transaction, frictionless maximized | Good (friction only when the ACS requires it) | Low | Issuer | Sound default for most European online merchants |
| Aggressive TRA/LVP exemptions + soft decline loop | Highest (+2 to +5 pts vs. systematic challenge) | Monitor: fraud liability returns to the merchant | Merchant on exempted transactions | Mature merchants with fraud under control (below 0.06%), real-time tooling |
Elsewhere in the world. The same mechanism, elsewhere.
Regulatory requirements for strong payer authentication
In the UK, the SCA requirement survived Brexit: the SCA-RTS were carried over into the FCA Handbook, which the FCA now amends itself, and have applied since September 14, 2019.
Financial Conduct Authority, “Strong Customer Authentication,” https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/strong-customer-authentication
In India, the Reserve Bank of India (Authentication mechanisms for digital payment transactions) Directions, 2025, issued on September 25, 2025, require at least two distinct authentication factors for every digital payment, one of which must be dynamically generated or proven for each transaction. Compliance is required by April 1, 2026, with six categories of use-case exemptions (low-value contactless, recurring e-mandates, NETC tolls, certain prepaid instruments, and others).
Reserve Bank of India (Authentication mechanisms for digital payment transactions) Directions, 2025, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=12898
Australia has no equivalent regulatory requirement. ASIC’s ePayments Code is a voluntary code that determines who bears the loss on an unauthorized transaction and sets out how mistaken transfers are recovered, without mandating any authentication method. Use of 3-D Secure there is governed by scheme rules.
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “ePayments Code,” https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/epayments-code/
The cardholder’s liability for unauthorized transactions
The US has two regimes. For credit cards, Regulation Z caps cardholder liability at $50 (12 CFR 1026.12(b)). For debit cards, Regulation E limits it to $50 if the transaction is reported within 2 business days and $500 after that, and removes the cap entirely for transfers occurring more than 60 days after the statement is sent.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 12 CFR 1026.12(b) and 12 CFR 1005.6, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1026/12/ and https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/6/
In the UK, regulation 77 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 caps the payer’s liability at £35 and reduces it to zero if the provider did not apply strong customer authentication when required, or once the loss of the instrument has been reported.
Payment Services Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/752), regulation 77, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/752/regulation/77
In India, the customer bears no liability if the transaction is reported within 3 business days. Between 4 and 7 business days, liability is capped by account type at ₹5,000 to ₹25,000. The bank must credit the disputed amount within 10 business days and resolve the complaint within 90 days at most.
Reserve Bank of India, circular RBI/2017-18/15 of July 6, 2017, “Customer Protection – Limiting Liability of Customers in Unauthorised Electronic Banking Transactions,” https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11040