Reference🛠️ Merchant setupAdvanced⏱ 18 min read

🔐 3-D Secure 2 and SCA exemptions

Frictionless, challenge, liability shift, TRA/LVP/MIT/MOTO exemptions, soft declines: the authentication protocol, and the exemption strategy that balances conversion, fraud, and liability.

The framework: PSD2, SCA, and EMV 3-D Secure

PSD2 requires strong customer authentication (SCA: two factors out of knowledge, possession, and inherence) for electronic payments initiated by the payer in the EEA. EMV 3-D Secure (3DS2), specified by EMVCo, is the protocol that delivers it for cards. It carries transaction and device data to the issuer, which decides whether to authenticate silently (frictionless) or to require a challenge.

2001
3DS1 (Verified by Visa)
Redirect and static password. Real security, but at the cost of conversion (down as much as 20% on some flows).
2016
EMV 3DS 2.0 specification
EMVCo overhaul: rich data, frictionless flows, native mobile support (SDK).
Sept. 14, 2019
SCA RTS take effect
SCA becomes a regulatory requirement in the EEA, with a migration plan overseen in France by the OSMP.
2021
Soft migration ends
Soft declines become the norm. Issuers decline unauthenticated transactions that carry no exemption.
Oct. 2022
3DS1 decommissioned
Visa and Mastercard retire 3DS1; 3DS2 (2.1/2.2) becomes the only protocol.
2023-2026
3DS 2.3.x
Gradual rollout: better SDK UX, WebAuthn/passkeys as an authentication method, device binding.
Browserdevice data (~130 fields)3DS Servermerchant / PSP sideDSscheme directory serverACSissuing bankcollectionAReqAReqFrictionless≈ 90–95% of transactionsChallengeOTP, banking app, biometricsARes = Y (low risk)ARes = CCReq / CResThe customer authenticatesthrough their bankAuthentication successfulliability shift → the issuer bears the fraudRich, consistent data= more frictionless
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Three servers, three parties
3DS2 connects the 3DS Server (merchant/PSP side), the DS (Directory Server, operated by the scheme), and the ACS (Access Control Server, issuer side). The merchant’s role is limited to passing data to the ACS through the 3DS Server. The ACS alone decides between frictionless and challenge.

Frictionless vs. challenge

In the frictionless flow, the ACS assesses risk using only the data it receives (AReq) and authenticates without any interaction. The cardholder sees nothing. In the challenge flow, the ACS requires an interaction, now mostly an approval in the banking app (possession of the phone plus a PIN or biometrics, which meets SCA). SMS OTP on its own has been dropped because it counts as only one factor.

How a 3DS2 authentication works
Merchant
Collects device data and sends the AReq
Via the 3DS Server: ~130 transaction and browser/SDK fields
Directory Server (scheme)
Routes the AReq to the issuer’s ACS
Lookup by BIN range
ACS (issuer)
Scores the risk
Known device, history, usual amount, exemption requested
ACS
Returns the ARes
transStatus Y (frictionless) or C (challenge required)
Cardholder
Completes the challenge if required
In-app approval + biometrics; CReq/CRes between browser and ACS
Merchant
Sends the authorization with proof
CAVV/AAV + ECI 05/02 in the authorization message
transStatusMeaningNext step
YAuthentication successful (frictionless or after a challenge)Authorize with CAVV + ECI 05 (Visa) / 02 (MC); issuer liability
AAttempt: the ACS could not authenticate, but the scheme attests to the attemptAuthorize with ECI 06/01; liability shift retained in most cases
CChallenge requiredPresent the challenge (CReq/CRes), then resume the flow
NNot authenticated / failedDo not authorize: decline almost certain, and no liability shift
UAuthentication unavailable (ACS down, etc.)Decide based on risk policy: retry, authorize without it (outside the EEA), or decline
RRejected by the issuer (do not retry)Abandon: the issuer refuses any authentication of this transaction
transStatus values (authentication result)
≈ 2/3
of 3DS2 authentications completed frictionless in the mature French market
OSMP / market observations 2024–2025
5-15 %
challenge abandonment, depending on ACS quality and device
PSP benchmarks
≈ 0,16 %
card-not-present fraud rate in France after SCA rollout, the lowest on record, compared with about 0.25% ten years earlier
OSMP, annual reports

Transmitted data: what drives frictionless

The 3DS2 AReq is the message the merchant uses to submit a transaction for authentication; the Directory Server then routes it to the issuer’s ACS. It can carry around 130 fields, about 100 of them mandatory or conditional and several dozen optional. That is the big difference from 3DS1. The more fields the merchant fills in, the more the ACS has to refine its score, and the more likely a frictionless outcome becomes. The fields fall into the following categories.

  • Browser device data (mandatory in browser flows): browserUserAgent, browserLanguage, browserScreenWidth/Height, browserTZ, browserJavaEnabled, browserAcceptHeader, IP address;
  • SDK device data (in-app flows): device identifiers, model, OS, jailbreak/root status; richer and more reliable than browser data;
  • Transaction data: amount, currency, date, planned recurrence (recurringFrequency, recurringExpiry);
  • Merchant risk indicators: shipping address, shipIndicator (ship to billing address, in-store pickup, digital goods, etc.), deliveryTimeframe, reorderItemsInd (repeat purchase), preOrderPurchaseInd;
  • Cardholder account info: customer account age (chAccAgeInd), date of last password change, number of transactions in the last 24 hours and the last year, number of saved cards;
  • Requestor data: threeDSRequestorChallengeInd, which lets the merchant request a challenge (03), indicate that it prefers none (02), or signal that a mandate requires SCA (04).
Annotated 3DS2 AReq excerpt (browser flow)
{
  "threeDSRequestorAuthenticationInd": "01",   // 01 = payment (vs. card enrollment)
  "threeDSRequestorChallengeInd": "02",        // 02 = no challenge requested
  "acctNumber": "4895370000000000",            // PAN or DPAN
  "purchaseAmount": "8990", "purchaseCurrency": "978",  // EUR 89.90 (ISO 4217)
  "browserIP": "92.184.100.23",
  "browserUserAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_5...)",
  "browserLanguage": "fr-FR", "browserTZ": "-120",
  "browserScreenWidth": "390", "browserScreenHeight": "844",
  "cardholderName": "MARIE DUPONT",
  "email": "marie.dupont@example.com",
  "shipAddrCity": "Paris", "shipAddrPostCode": "75002", "shipAddrCountry": "250",
  "merchantRiskIndicator": {
    "shipIndicator": "01",                     // ship to billing address
    "deliveryTimeframe": "03",                 // overnight delivery (within 24 hours)
    "reorderItemsInd": "02"                    // reorder of a previously purchased item
  },
  "acctInfo": {
    "chAccAgeInd": "05",                       // customer account created > 60 days ago
    "nbPurchaseAccount": "11",                 // 11 purchases in the last 6 months
    "suspiciousAccActivity": "01"              // no suspicious activity observed
  }
}
// Rich, consistent data -> low ACS risk score -> transStatus Y, no challenge.
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Frictionless is won on the merchant side
The challenge rate depends on the ACS. With the same ACS, two merchants sending transactions to the same issuer get very different frictionless rates depending on how complete their AReqs are. Auditing the fields the PSP actually sends is a quick win that keeps paying off, since many setups send only the mandatory minimum by default. Enriching the AReq adds 5 to 15 points of frictionless rate.

Liability shift: who bears the fraud loss?

A liability shift moves the cost of fraud from one party to the transaction to another. On unauthenticated card-not-present transactions, that cost falls on the merchant, in the form of a fraud chargeback. 3DS authentication shifts it to the issuer: a cardholder who disputes an authenticated transaction can no longer obtain a fraud chargeback. Non-fraud reasons, such as items not received or not as described, remain available in every case.

ScenarioECI (Visa/MC)Fraud liabilityNotes
3DS successful (frictionless or challenge)05 / 02IssuerMaximum protection against fraud chargebacks
Attempt (ACS unavailable)06 / 01Issuer (usually)The scheme attests to the attempt; detailed rules vary by brand
Exemption requested by the acquirer (TRA, LVP)07 / 00 + exemption flagMerchant/acquirerThe price of a smooth checkout: no SCA, no shift
Exemption applied by the issuer (issuer TRA)07 / 00IssuerBest case: smooth checkout AND protection
MOTOno 3DSMerchantOut of SCA scope; no protection
Properly linked MITno 3DSIssuer if the initial CIT was authenticatedProof of the mandate relies on network transaction linking
No 3DS, no exemption (EEA)07 / 00Merchant + likely declineSoft decline expected: avoid this case
Fraud liability matrix by scenario
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A liability shift is not all-risk insurance
The shift covers only fraud chargebacks (Visa 10.x, Mastercard 4837, etc.). Commercial disputes (4853, 13.x) remain the merchant’s responsibility. A merchant that lets questionable transactions through frictionless pushes up the fraud rate the issuer sees, and the issuer responds with more challenges and lower approval rates. The shift changes who bears the cost of fraud; it does not reduce the amount of fraud.

SCA exemptions in detail

The RTS (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389) provide exemptions from SCA, which the acquirer requests in the authorization flow (or the issuer applies). Separately, some cases are out of scope and are not exemptions at all, such as MITs, MOTO, and one-leg-out transactions (one of the two banks outside the EEA). The distinction matters. An issuer can refuse an exemption requested from it, whereas an out-of-scope transaction is by definition not subject to the authentication requirement.

Remote card payment in the EEApayer present? both PSPs in the EEA?Out of scopeMOTO · linked MIT · one-leg-outExemption requestedTRA · LVP · trusted beneficiary · corporateSCA applied3DS2 → issuer ACSoutside PSD2 scopeSCA required, attempted frictionlessSCA required, appliednetworkTxReferenceTRA ≤ €100/€250/€500LVP ≤ €30frictionless or challengeApprovedzero frictionSoft decline 1A / 65the issuer requires SCAtransStatus Y / ACAVV + ECIexemption acceptedexemption refusedretry with 3DS, never abandonFraud liability on the MERCHANTchargeback 10.4 defensibleFraud liability on the ISSUERliability shiftno liability shiftwithout authenticationOut of scopeExemption: 0 frictionSCA: liability shiftTRA thresholds of €100 / €250 / €500 = the PSP's reference fraud rate (13 / 6 / 1 bp), RTS (EU) 2018/389, Articles 16 and 18 + Annex.
CaseLegal basisConditions and thresholdsFraud liability
Acquirer TRA (Transaction Risk Analysis)RTS Art. 18Acquirer’s card-not-present fraud rate: ≤ 0.13% → baskets up to €100; ≤ 0.06% → up to €250; ≤ 0.01% → up to €500Merchant/acquirer
Issuer TRARTS Art. 18Same thresholds, based on the issuer’s fraud rate; issuer decides, frictionlessIssuer
LVP (Low Value Payment)RTS Art. 16Up to €30, with issuer counters: SCA required after 5 transactions in a row are exempted or €100 cumulativeMerchant/acquirer if requested by the acquirer
Trusted beneficiaries (whitelisting)RTS Art. 13The cardholder adds the merchant to a trusted list with its issuer (during a challenge); later transactions are exemptIssuer
Secure corporate paymentsRTS Art. 17Lodged cards, virtual cards, or dedicated corporate processes (business travel, etc.) using secure protocolsIssuer (through dedicated processes)
MITOut of SCA scopeMandate set up by an authenticated initial CIT + correct network linkingIssuer, if linking is valid
MOTO (Mail Order / Telephone Order)Out of scope (not an electronic payment under PSD2)Mail or phone order, secure manual key entryMerchant
One-leg-outOutside territorial scopeIssuer or acquirer outside the EEA: SCA on a best-effort basisStandard scheme rules apply
Anonymous prepaidOut of scope (PSD2 Art. 63)Anonymous gift cards up to €150Scheme rules apply
Exemptions and out-of-scope cases: conditions, thresholds, liability
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The issuer always has the final say
An exemption requested by the acquirer is still at the issuer’s discretion, and the issuer is not obliged to grant it. The issuer can respond with a soft decline (1A/65) requiring SCA, even on a €15 basket. Exemption approval rates vary widely between issuers, from 50% to 95% for acquirer TRA. An exemption strategy is therefore managed issuer by issuer, based on observed rates.

The applicable TRA threshold depends on the fraud rate of the acquirer (for acquirer TRA), calculated quarterly under the RTS methodology. A merchant with a low fraud rate is still capped by the overall rate of its acquirer’s portfolio. The fraud levels of other merchants in that portfolio therefore set the exemption ceiling available to it, which affects the choice of acquirer and how MIDs are segmented.

Soft declines and exemption strategy

A soft decline is a recoverable decline by which the issuer requires authentication: code `1A` at Visa (Additional customer authentication required) and `65` at Mastercard, repurposed for this use under PSD2. It tells the merchant that the transaction can go through if resubmitted with 3DS. Every European payment flow must implement this resubmission loop.

Soft decline recovery loop
Merchant
Authorization with TRA exemption
€85 basket, no 3DS, exemption flag in the message
Issuer
Issues a soft decline
Response code 1A (Visa) or 65 (Mastercard): SCA required
Merchant / PSP
Triggers 3DS2 immediately
The customer is still in session: AReq sent with the data already collected
Issuer ACS
Frictionless or challenge
An issuer that soft-declined will often, but not always, challenge
Merchant
New authorization with CAVV + ECI 05
Observed recovery rate: 60–80% of soft declines
StrategyConversionFraud and chargebacksLiabilityBest for
Full 3DS, challenges acceptedLowest (5–15% challenge abandonment)MinimalIssuer on almost everythingHigh-fraud sectors (ticketing, resalable electronics), large baskets
3DS on every transaction, frictionless maximizedGood (friction only when the ACS requires it)LowIssuerSound default for most European online merchants
Aggressive TRA/LVP exemptions + soft decline loopHighest (+2 to +5 pts vs. systematic challenge)Monitor: fraud liability returns to the merchantMerchant on exempted transactionsMature merchants with fraud under control (below 0.06%), real-time tooling
Three authentication strategies: trade-offs between conversion, fraud, and liability
+2 to +5 pts
conversion gain from a well-calibrated exemption strategy vs. systematic 3DS challenges
European PSP benchmarks
60-80 %
of soft declines converted into sales by automatic 3DS resubmission
Market benchmarks
0,13 % / 0,06 % / 0,01 %
RTS reference fraud rates that unlock the €100 / €250 / €500 TRA thresholds
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, Art. 18
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The right objective function
The quantity to maximize in this trade-off is net margin after fraud = conversion × basket − fraud losses borne − chargeback handling costs. Neither the frictionless rate nor the exemption rate plays that role. A TRA exemption can gain 2 points of conversion while shifting 0.3% of fraud onto the merchant, and still hurt results on a low-margin basket. The calculation must be rerun continuously, by segment (issuer × amount × product).

Elsewhere in the world. The same mechanism, elsewhere.

Regulatory requirements for strong payer authentication

In the UK, the SCA requirement survived Brexit: the SCA-RTS were carried over into the FCA Handbook, which the FCA now amends itself, and have applied since September 14, 2019.

Financial Conduct Authority, “Strong Customer Authentication,” https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/strong-customer-authentication

India

In India, the Reserve Bank of India (Authentication mechanisms for digital payment transactions) Directions, 2025, issued on September 25, 2025, require at least two distinct authentication factors for every digital payment, one of which must be dynamically generated or proven for each transaction. Compliance is required by April 1, 2026, with six categories of use-case exemptions (low-value contactless, recurring e-mandates, NETC tolls, certain prepaid instruments, and others).

Reserve Bank of India (Authentication mechanisms for digital payment transactions) Directions, 2025, https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=12898

Australia

Australia has no equivalent regulatory requirement. ASIC’s ePayments Code is a voluntary code that determines who bears the loss on an unauthorized transaction and sets out how mistaken transfers are recovered, without mandating any authentication method. Use of 3-D Secure there is governed by scheme rules.

Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “ePayments Code,” https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/epayments-code/

The cardholder’s liability for unauthorized transactions

The US has two regimes. For credit cards, Regulation Z caps cardholder liability at $50 (12 CFR 1026.12(b)). For debit cards, Regulation E limits it to $50 if the transaction is reported within 2 business days and $500 after that, and removes the cap entirely for transfers occurring more than 60 days after the statement is sent.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 12 CFR 1026.12(b) and 12 CFR 1005.6, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1026/12/ and https://www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/6/

In the UK, regulation 77 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 caps the payer’s liability at £35 and reduces it to zero if the provider did not apply strong customer authentication when required, or once the loss of the instrument has been reported.

Payment Services Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/752), regulation 77, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/752/regulation/77

India

In India, the customer bears no liability if the transaction is reported within 3 business days. Between 4 and 7 business days, liability is capped by account type at ₹5,000 to ₹25,000. The bank must credit the disputed amount within 10 business days and resolve the complaint within 90 days at most.

Reserve Bank of India, circular RBI/2017-18/15 of July 6, 2017, “Customer Protection – Limiting Liability of Customers in Unauthorised Electronic Banking Transactions,” https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11040