Reference🔐 Security & dataAdvanced⏱ 16 min read

🛡️ PCI DSS in practice

The card data security standard, version 4.0.1: CDE scope, the 12 requirements, choosing an SAQ, scope reduction, and the new anti-skimming requirements

What PCI DSS is and who it applies to

PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard) is the security standard that governs how payment card data is stored, processed, and transmitted. It is published by the PCI SSC (Security Standards Council), a consortium founded in 2006 by the five major card networks: Visa, Mastercard, American Express, Discover, and JCB. No government regulator issues it. Its force is contractual: the networks and acquirers impose it on every company that touches card data.

The five founding members of the PCI SSCVisaMastercardAmerican ExpressDIDiscoverJCJCB

The current version is v4.0, published in March 2022 and revised as v4.0.1 in June 2024 (editorial corrections, no new requirements). Version 3.2.1 was retired on March 31, 2024. A set of “future-dated” requirements, treated until then as best practice only, became mandatory on March 31, 2025. That transition drives most of the standard's news in 2025 and 2026.

2006
PCI SSC founded
The five networks merge their own security programs (Visa's CISP, Mastercard's SDP, and others) into a single common standard.
March 2022
PCI DSS v4.0 published
Major overhaul: the customized approach, targeted risk analyses, and stronger authentication.
March 31, 2024
v3.2.1 retired
Version 4.x becomes the only version accepted for new assessments.
June 2024
v4.0.1
Limited revision: clarifications and corrections, with no requirements added or removed.
March 31, 2025
Future-dated requirements take effect
The 51 requirements that had been best practice only become mandatory, including 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 against browser-side skimming.
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Compliance is not immunity
PCI DSS compliance greatly reduces the attack surface, but it does not prove the absence of vulnerabilities. The assessment covers the state of controls observed on the audit date, an annual snapshot, while exposure to attack is a permanent condition. Many high-profile breaches hit companies that had been validated as “compliant” at the time.

The CDE: defining and reducing scope

The CDE (Cardholder Data Environment) comprises the people, processes, and systems that store, process, or transmit account data, plus any connected system that could compromise them. Defining its boundary is the first step in any compliance project. It sets the list of assets to assess and drives the cost of the assessment, because anything out of scope is exempt from the requirements.

Out of scope: no access to account dataSAQ ASystems connected to the CDE or affecting its security: auditedSAQ A-EPCDE: stores, processes, or transmits account dataSAQ DPayment serverhandles the PANToken vaultPAN unreadable (Requirement 3)POS / SRED readerreads the stripe and the chipBastion / adminadmin access to the CDEAD · logs · NTPsecurity servicesPayment pageserves the form (6.4.3)ERP · logisticssees the order ID, not the PANOffice IT · marketingseparate VLAN, no CDE trafficthese levers take systems out of the CDEiframe / PSP redirecttokenizationvalidated P2PEtested network segmentation“Out of scope” has to be proven: annual data-flow mapping and segmentation testing.You don't get to declare it: the applicable questionnaire follows from the scope, never the other way around.

PCI DSS splits account data into two categories with radically different retention rules. Cardholder data may be stored as long as it is protected. Sensitive authentication data (SAD) must never be retained after authorization, even in encrypted form.

ItemCategoryStorage permittedMust be rendered unreadable
Card number (PAN)Cardholder dataYesYes
Cardholder nameCardholder dataYesNo (but in scope and protected)
Expiration dateCardholder dataYesNo
Service codeCardholder dataYesNo
Full track or chip dataSADNever after authorizationN/A
Card security code (CVV2 / CVC2 / CID)SADNever after authorizationN/A
PIN / PIN blockSADNever after authorizationN/A
Account data retention rules (Requirement 3)
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The stored security code trap
Storing the CVV “to make recurring payments easier” is the most common violation, and the most heavily penalized. It breaches Requirement 3.3.1, which prohibits retaining sensitive authentication data after authorization. The networks penalize it under their contracts, and fraudsters exploit the stored security codes as soon as the database leaks. For subscriptions, standard practice is to store a token issued through tokenization instead of the card data.

Network segmentation isolates the CDE from the rest of the IT environment with VLANs, firewalls, and access controls. It keeps a compromised office workstation from becoming a pivot point into the systems that handle card data. It also takes dozens of machines out of audit scope, which makes it the main lever for reducing scope.

The 12 requirements, grouped under six goals

The standard consists of 12 requirements organized under six broad goals, each broken down into dozens of testable sub-requirements. The table below gives an overview.

GoalN°RequirementIn plain terms
Secure network1Network security controlsFirewalls and filtering between the CDE and everything else
Secure network2Secure configurationsNo default passwords or unnecessary services
Protect account data3Protect stored account dataEncrypt or truncate the PAN; never keep SAD
Protect account data4Encrypt transmissions over open networksStrong end-to-end TLS over the internet
Vulnerability management5Protect against malwareAnti-malware kept current and monitored
Vulnerability management6Develop and maintain secure systemsPatching, secure development, script management
Access control7Restrict access on a need-to-know basisLeast privilege, role-based access
Access control8Identify and authenticate accessIndividual user IDs, MFA across the board
Access control9Restrict physical accessSecure premises, media, and terminals
Monitor and test10Log and monitor accessAudit trails, timestamps, log review
Monitor and test11Test security regularlyASV scans, penetration tests, tamper detection
Policy12Information security policyGovernance, awareness, third-party management
The 12 requirements of PCI DSS v4.0.1
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Defined approach vs. customized approach
Version 4.0 introduces two paths to compliance. The defined approach means implementing each requirement as written. The customized approach meets the security objective by means the entity chooses, documented in a targeted risk analysis and validated by a QSA. This second path lets organizations with mature security programs choose their own controls, in exchange for a heavier documentation and testing burden.

New in v4: 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 against e-skimming

Browser-side skimming means injecting malicious code into the payment page as it renders in the customer's browser, a technique known as Magecart-style attacks. Two of the requirements that became mandatory on March 31, 2025 explicitly target this attack. Earlier versions of the standard covered the merchant's server-side systems and did not address code running in the browser.

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Requirement 6.4.3
Manage every script loaded in the browser on the payment page: inventory each one, justify why it is there (authorization), and ensure its integrity. No more third-party scripts added without a trail.
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Requirement 11.6.1
Deploy a change- and tamper-detection mechanism that alerts on unauthorized changes to the HTTP headers and content of the payment page, and run it at least weekly.

A modern payment page routinely loads dozens of third-party scripts (analytics, chat, A/B testing), and any one of them can be hijacked to read input fields. Defenses combine CSP (Content Security Policy), Subresource Integrity (SRI), and monitoring of the script inventory. A card entry form in an iframe hosted by the PSP keeps card data out of the merchant's DOM, so the page's scripts can no longer reach it.

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The PSP iframe, best ally for 6.4.3
When card entry is delegated to fields hosted by the provider (hosted fields or an iframe), the data never passes through the merchant's page. The number of scripts to monitor under 6.4.3 drops, and the merchant then often qualifies for SAQ A.

Merchant levels, SAQs, and attestation

How a company proves compliance depends on its transaction volume and how it accepts cards. The networks define four merchant levels. Above roughly 6 million card transactions a year (Level 1), the entity must produce a ROC (Report on Compliance) prepared by a QSA (Qualified Security Assessor). Below that, it can use a self-assessment questionnaire (SAQ) that fits its setup.

LevelAnnual card transaction volumeRequired validation
Level 1Over 6 million (all channels) or any breached merchantOn-site audit + ROC by a QSA, quarterly ASV scans
Level 21 to 6 millionSAQ (the acquirer sometimes requires an audit), ASV scans
Level 320,000 to 1 million e-commerceSAQ + quarterly ASV scans
Level 4Under 20,000 e-commerce; up to 1 million in other channelsSAQ + ASV scans, at the acquirer's discretion
Merchant levels (indicative, based on Visa and Mastercard thresholds)

The SAQ is a family of questionnaires, each designed for a specific way of accepting cards. The right questionnaire depends on how the entity receives and handles card data, and that choice sets how many requirements it must demonstrate.

SAQTypical setupNumber of requirements (approx.)
AE-commerce, 100% outsourced (redirect or PSP iframe)Shortest
A-EPPartially outsourced e-commerce; the merchant's page affects securityMedium, up sharply
B / B-IPStandalone terminals (dial-out or IP)Short
C-VTVirtual terminal (manual entry in an isolated browser)Short to medium
CInternet-connected payment applicationMethod
P2PEPCI-validated P2PE terminalGreatly reduced by hardware encryption
DAll other merchants and all service providersMost comprehensive (all 12 requirements)
Main SAQ types
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Both the SAQ and the ROC come with an AOC (Attestation of Compliance), a summary document submitted to the acquirer. The attestation states the outcome of the assessment without detailing the findings. When a partner vets a vendor's compliance, the AOC is what it most often asks for, rather than the full report.

Costs, scope reduction, and penalties

Compliance costs vary widely from one company to the next, and scope is the first driver. The broader the scope, the more expensive the audit, since the number of systems, data flows, and controls to review grows with it. Tokenization, P2PE, and outsourced card entry shrink the scope, move a merchant from SAQ D down to SAQ A, and cut the workload tenfold.

March 31, 2025
date the v4 future-dated requirements became mandatory
PCI SSC
12
core requirements, broken down into hundreds of testable controls
5 000 – 100 000 $
monthly range of contractual penalties the networks can levy for non-compliance (order of magnitude)
$4.88M
global average cost of a data breach, all industries
IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2024
Customerenters the PAN onceMerchant / PSPnever stores the PANToken ServiceVisa VTS · Mastercard MDESIssuerapproves the tokenPANtoken requestTARDPAN (network token)bound to one card × merchant pairprovisioningSubsequent paymentstoken + dynamic cryptogramone-click / MITCard reissued or expired: the token staysvalid (updated by the scheme) →+2 to 3 pts of approval rate
  • Outsource card entry (PSP iframe or redirect) to qualify for SAQ A.
  • Tokenize PANs at the point of entry, so no cleartext card data remains at rest.
  • Segment the network to isolate and shrink the CDE.
  • Choose validated P2PE terminals for in-store payments.
  • Map card data flows at least once a year. It is a requirement, and the best way to spot scope that has drifted.
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Beyond the fine
Monthly network penalties are only part of the cost of a breach. The breached company also bears card reissuance costs, forensic investigations by a PCI Forensic Investigator (PFI), and lost trust, and it may be reclassified as Level 1 with a mandatory on-site audit. The real cost runs to hundreds of thousands of euros, on top of the reputational damage.