Managing interchange and merchant fees. 6 chapters and a final quiz.
The job of a payments manager who negotiates acquiring, step by step. Build a usable cost base, unpack an interchange++ statement line, trace the gap between the gross submitted and the net settled, identify the regime that applies to each transaction, set up least-cost routing without losing approvals, and decide on a compliant surcharge where surcharging is allowed. Then run an RFP priced on your own data and write the clauses that make the agreement enforceable.
Build the cost base for a negotiation: transaction-level extract, effective MDR, and the cost of declines and disputes
Unpack an interchange++ statement line and isolate the residual that no billed component explains
Determine, transaction by transaction, the interchange regime that applies and what falls outside every cap
Set up and test least-cost routing without hurting the authorization rate
Chapter 1. Building your cost base.
The cost base is the transaction dataset a merchant uses to negotiate acquiring, plus the handful of metrics derived from it. The payments manager assembles it before the first meeting, from an extract supplied by the incumbent acquirer. A rolling 12 months is the minimum, and both parties must be able to verify every line. A negotiation built on a headline rate and a hunch ends in a cosmetic discount, calculated on a card mix nobody has measured. You build the cost base once, then refresh it every quarter, because a card mix shifts faster than a contract.
What to ask your acquirer for, and in what format
A transaction-level extract, not a summary report: a monthly aggregate blends together exactly the dimensions you are trying to see
A rolling 12 months at minimum, to absorb seasonality and promotional campaigns
A machine-readable format: CSV or a standard settlement file, never a 30-page PDF
The unique transaction identifier (ARN or its local equivalent), the only way to reconcile the statement, the batch log, and the remittance advice
The card’s country of issue, derived from the BIN by the acquirer: this is what moves a line inside or outside a cap
The exact card product (consumer debit, consumer credit, commercial, prepaid), not just the brand
The authorization result, declines included: a declined transaction still costs money and shows up in no fee rate
The interchange program code applied by the network, when the acquirer reports it: it names the rate schedule actually used
Working template: three queries that produce the cost base
-- Minimum columns expected in the extract:
-- arn, processing_date, gross_amount, currency, brand, card_product,
-- issuer_country, channel, auth_result,
-- interchange, scheme_fees, margin, ancillary_fees
-- 1. Overall effective MDR, in basis points
SELECT ROUND(10000.0 * SUM(interchange + scheme_fees + margin + ancillary_fees)
/ SUM(gross_amount), 1) AS effective_mdr_bp
FROM transactions
WHERE auth_result = 'CAPTURED';
-- 2. The same calculation by segment: this is the table you bring to the negotiation
SELECT card_product, issuer_country, channel,
COUNT(*) AS txn_count,
SUM(gross_amount) AS gross,
ROUND(10000.0 * SUM(interchange) / SUM(gross_amount), 1) AS interchange_bp,
ROUND(10000.0 * SUM(scheme_fees) / SUM(gross_amount), 1) AS scheme_bp,
ROUND(10000.0 * SUM(margin) / SUM(gross_amount), 1) AS margin_bp
FROM transactions
WHERE auth_result = 'CAPTURED'
GROUP BY card_product, issuer_country, channel
ORDER BY gross DESC;
-- 3. The cost nobody counts: declined attempts
SELECT COUNT(*) AS declines,
SUM(ancillary_fees) AS fees_billed_on_declines
FROM transactions
WHERE auth_result = 'DECLINED';
The effective MDR is total payment-related fees divided by gross volume collected over the same period. It is the only figure that compares across offers, provided both calculations use the same scope in the numerator. Acquirers calculate it differently. Dispute fees belong in the numerator, and so do monthly minimums. Express the result in basis points, never as a percentage rounded to two decimal places, because rounding erases the very order of magnitude you are trying to measure. A 10-basis-point gap on 50 million collected is worth 50,000 currency units a year, and that calculation alone tells you how much effort the negotiation deserves.
Indicator
What it measures
Where to find it
What it decides
Effective MDR
Total payment cost divided by gross volume collected
Transaction-level extract and monthly invoice
The size of the ask, in basis points
Mix by card product
Share of volume on commercial, premium, and prepaid cards
Card product column in the extract
What falls outside the caps, and so cannot be negotiated through the rate
Inter-regional share
Volume on cards issued outside the acquiring region
Country of issue derived from the BIN
Exposure to the highest rate schedules and to inbound tourism
Unit authorization cost
Fixed fee billed per attempt, declines included
Pricing appendix, cross-checked against the decline count
The real price of a high decline rate and of subscription retries
Dispute costs
Fee per case opened, regardless of outcome
Dedicated line on the monthly statement
What an investment in deflection or fraud prevention is worth
Five metrics to produce before any RFP
⚠️
Four calculation errors that undermine the whole case
Four calculation errors keep coming up when merchants build their effective MDR. Dividing by the net amount settled instead of the gross amount submitted lowers the rate artificially, by exactly the amount of the fee, and picking a slow month flatters the result further. Ignoring declined authorizations wipes out an entire cost line, one that grows with every subscription retry and every automatic reattempt. Counting authorized volume rather than captured volume inflates the denominator. Each of the four shows up in the extract file if you check the denominator used, the period chosen, and how declined attempts were treated. A sales brochure shows none of these three.
🎯 Quick question
Why insist on a transaction-level extract rather than a monthly summary report?
Chapter 2. Unpacking a line and tracing the gross-to-net gap.
Unpacking a line means breaking down the gap between the amount submitted for settlement and the amount received in the bank account. The exercise rests on a reconciliation check: interchange, scheme fees, margin, and ancillary fees, added together, must reproduce that gap to the cent. Whatever part of the gap the sum fails to cover is called the residual. You cannot guess where a residual comes from by its size. Have the acquirer name it in writing, line by line.
Three-line exercise with illustrative amounts: redo it on your own statement
LINE A — e-commerce, consumer debit card issued in the acquiring region
gross submitted .............. 100.00
interchange billed ........... 0.20 20.0 bp
scheme fees billed ........... 0.06 6.0 bp
acquirer margin .............. 0.25 25.0 bp
total billed ................. 0.51 51.0 bp
net settled .................. 99.49
CHECK: 100.00 - 99.49 = 0.51 the gap is fully explained
LINE B — same transaction, same acquirer, blended contract at 1.10%
gross submitted .............. 100.00
fee billed ................... 1.10 110.0 bp
net settled .................. 98.90
CHECK: the gap is explained, but NOTHING can be verified
Implied margin = 110.0 - (20.0 + 6.0) = 84.0 bp
... valid only if the segment's actual interchange and scheme
fees really match line A. This is an estimate, not a reading.
LINE C — the line that triggers a written request
gross submitted .............. 100.00
interchange + scheme + margin . 0.51
net settled .................. 99.31
UNEXPLAINED RESIDUAL ......... 0.18 18.0 bp outside the breakdown
Possible causes: cross-border fee, network program fee,
dispute adjustment, carryover from a prior month. Four causes,
four contacts, four fixes. None can be inferred from the amount.
A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point, and it is the unit for measuring the components of a fee. A rounded percentage hides gaps worth tens of thousands of currency units a year on ordinary volume. Convert at extraction: divide the fee amount by the gross amount, then multiply by 10,000. A pivot table then produces the same measure by brand, by card product, and by channel, which exposes the segments where the margin drifts. Run over 12 months, the exercise reveals what no single monthly statement shows: a margin that varies from one segment to the next, with some of those gaps explained by no rate schedule constraint at all. That table is the exhibit you bring to the negotiation, because the monthly statement shows none of this dispersion.
Extracting the implied margin from a blended contract
Isolate a homogeneous segment in the extract: one brand, one card product, one country of issue, one channel.
Look up that segment’s interchange rate in the network’s published schedule, or in the legal cap where one exists.
Estimate the segment’s scheme fees from an unblended quote obtained elsewhere, or from an interchange++ statement the same acquirer issues for another scope.
Subtract those two components from the blended rate charged: what remains is the acquirer’s implied margin on that segment.
Repeat segment by segment. The implied margin on a blended contract varies widely across segments, and that dispersion is what you negotiate.
Item
Basis
What drives it
Merchant lever
Authorization
Per attempt, approved or declined
Number of attempts, automatic retries, subscription rebilling attempts
Cap retries, eliminate futile reattempts, negotiate tiered unit pricing
Disputes
Per case opened, whatever the outcome
Dispute rate, billing descriptor clarity, delivery times
Upstream deflection, a recognizable descriptor, a negotiated unit price, and a discount on cases won
Cross-border fee
Every transaction with a foreign issuer
Share of international volume, card issuing countries
Local acquiring in high-volume countries, a local merchant entity
Monthly minimum
Gap between a contractual threshold and actual billing
Seasonality, a low-volume secondary channel
Remove the minimum, or align it with the slowest month of the past 12
Program and non-compliance fees
Flat fee or penalty imposed by the network
Fraud rate, dispute rate, breaching a program threshold
Monthly threshold monitoring, a documented and dated exit plan
Fees billed per item, and the lever available on each
ℹ️
Make the acquirer explain every statement label
An itemized statement uses the acquirer’s own labels, which have no obvious match with the network schedule they pass through. A mapping table reconciles the two naming systems. It links each statement label to the network fee passed through, its calculation basis, and its frequency. Get the table from the acquirer, then attach it to the contract as an appendix, where it becomes enforceable. Without it, a network fee increase and a margin increase look the same on the invoice.
🎯 Quick question
On a line with 100.00 gross, interchange, scheme fees, and margin total 0.51, but the net settled is 99.31. What does the payments manager do?
Chapter 3. Finding the regime that applies to each transaction.
An interchange cap applies to a transaction, not to the merchant accepting it. Two identical sales, made in the same minute on the same website, can therefore fall under two different regimes and carry completely unrelated interchange. The applicable regime depends on the card itself: where it was issued, which product it is, and which network it runs on. Neither the merchant’s country nor the cart size plays any part. So the sorting happens line by line, in the extract.
Which regime applies to this line?
1. Country of issue
Read the issuer’s country, derived from the BIN
Issuer inside or outside the acquiring region: this single variable moves a line inside or outside the domestic cap
➜
2. Card product
Tell consumer, commercial, and prepaid cards apart
Article 1(4) of the IFR excludes commercial cards from its scope; Brazilian prepaid cards, by contrast, are capped at 0.7% under Resolução BCB nº 246/2022
➜
3. Network
Identify the brand and its business model
A three-party scheme shows no interchange; Article 1(3) of the IFR excludes it, unless cards are issued under license or through an agent (CJEU, Case C-304/16, 2018)
➜
4. Channel
Separate card-present from card-not-present sales
For consumer cards issued outside the EEA, the 2019 commitments set 0.2% and 0.3% card-present, versus 1.15% and 1.5% card-not-present (European Commission, IP/19/2311)
➜
5. Applicable regime
Apply the rate schedule, then check the amount billed
The cap is an enforceable maximum; the network’s actual schedule sometimes goes lower, depending on the merchant category code and the channel
Market
Cap in force
Outside the cap
Statement check
European Economic Area
0.2% on consumer debit and 0.3% on consumer credit, intra-region (Regulation (EU) 2015/751, Articles 3 and 4, caps in force since December 9, 2015)
Recalculate interchange on intra-region consumer lines; dispute any overcharge, with supporting evidence
Cards issued outside the EEA, acquired in the EEA
0.2%/0.3% card-present, 1.15%/1.5% card-not-present (antitrust commitments, European Commission, IP/19/2311, 2019, extended to November 2029)
Cross-border fees, scheme fees
Isolate volume by country of issue before modeling inbound tourism
UK
0.2% on UK domestic debit (the IFR as retained in UK law, Article 3)
The UK–EEA corridor, where no cap applies
Separate domestic traffic from EEA traffic: the PSR puts the extra cost at £150M–£200M a year (MR22/2, December 2024)
United States
21 cents + 5 basis points, plus a 1-cent fraud adjustment, on debit from issuers with at least $10B in assets (Regulation II, 12 CFR 235)
All credit; debit from exempt issuers
Demand the debit split between covered and exempt issuers: $0.23 vs. $0.51 on average in 2024 (Federal Reserve Board)
Australia
8 cents or 0.16% on domestic debit and prepaid, 0.30% on consumer credit, from October 1, 2026; 1% on foreign cards from April 1, 2027 (RBA, Conclusions Paper, March 31, 2026)
Scheme fees, margin; domestic commercial credit stays at 0.80%
Check the effective date the acquirer actually applied, category by category
New Zealand
Caps under the Mastercard and Visa Interchange Fee Network Standard 2025, in force since December 1, 2025, and for foreign-issued cards since May 1, 2026 (Commerce Commission)
Scheme fees, acquiring margin
Check that the caps have actually been applied to foreign cards since May 2026
Brazil
0.5% hard cap on debit and 0.7% on prepaid, since April 1, 2023 (Resolução BCB nº 246/2022)
Credit, entirely unregulated
Track debit, prepaid, and credit separately: here, the mix alone explains the bill
India
Zero MDR on RuPay debit cards and BHIM-UPI since January 1, 2020 (Income-tax Act 1961, Section 269SU); 0.40% on UPI merchant payments above ₹2,000 from October 15, 2026 (NPCI)
Visa and Mastercard cards issued in India, at a negotiated MDR
Separate RuPay volume from international volume before projecting any costs
China
0.35% on domestic debit and 0.45% on domestic credit, plus a network fee (NDRC/PBOC notice 发改价格〔2016〕557号, since September 6, 2016)
UnionPay schedules outside China, roughly 0.20% to 1.50% depending on the market
Separate domestic acquiring from UnionPay acceptance abroad
Canada
0.95% average credit interchange card-present, for merchants below a sales threshold (voluntary commitments, since October 19, 2024)
Merchants above C$300,000 in Visa sales or C$175,000 in Mastercard sales a year
Check eligibility under the thresholds before budgeting the reduction
What is capped, what stays outside the cap, and the check to run
Count the lines with no usable country of issue: above a few percent, no cap check is possible, and the acquirer should be told in writing.
Recalculate interchange on a sample of 100 capped lines: the rate must come out at or below the cap.
Measure the share of commercial cards: it is the first explanation for an effective MDR higher than the quoted rate suggested.
Track scheme fees as a monthly series, in basis points: the UK’s Payment Systems Regulator found that “core” scheme and processing fees have risen at least 25% in real terms since 2017, costing at least £170 million a year (PSR, MR22/1.10, March 6, 2025).
Date every rate schedule change: a regulatory reduction has an effective date, and you verify it was applied on the following month’s statement.
The country of issue is often missing from the first file you receive. Ask for the issuer’s country, derived from the BIN, reported per transaction and tied to the line’s unique identifier. The acquirer has this data, since it uses it to apply the network’s rate schedules. A refusal to provide it is therefore not a technical constraint, and it tells you something about the state of the commercial relationship.
Segmentation produces a cost map. A single merchant often sees four regimes coexist in one month: intra-region consumer cards at the cap, commercial cards outside the cap, inter-regional cards under the antitrust schedule, and prepaid under the local rule. No rate negotiation reduces the last three. Reducing them depends on the mix, and so on acceptance, routing, and the checkout flow. The line between what you negotiate through the rate and what you reduce through the mix sets the order of the work.
⚠️
A cap is not a price
A regulatory cap sets the maximum an issuer may collect on a transaction, but it does not set the price. The price is the network’s schedule rate, up to that cap. Networks publish detailed schedules by merchant category code, product, and channel, and many lines fall well below the legal cap. A budget that assumes the cap on all volume therefore overstates interchange and understates the acquirer’s margin by the same amount. Check against the network’s published schedule, not against the regulation.
🎯 Quick question
An e-commerce merchant based in the European Economic Area sees 1.15% interchange on a consumer debit card. What hypothesis should it check first?
Chapter 4. Setting up least-cost routing.
Routing is the choice of which network carries a card transaction. It is configured both at the acquirer and on the merchant’s payment gateway. Unless the merchant asks, the acquirer’s default setting applies, and that default was not chosen with the merchant’s interests in mind. Three families of regimes coexist worldwide, distinguished by who makes the choice: the cardholder, the acquirer, or the issuer when the card is issued. The action to take depends on the family, and it changes from market to market for the same company.
Market
Who chooses
Applicable rule
Merchant action
Australia
The acquirer, on the merchant’s behalf
Least-cost routing promoted by the Reserve Bank of Australia on eftpos co-badged debit cards
Request activation in writing: AP+ measures debit acceptance costs about 20% lower with routing switched on (AP+, 2025)
United States
The merchant, on its payment gateway
Regulation II: two unaffiliated networks per debit card, a requirement extended to card-not-present sales in July 2023
Set the order of preference between the brand and a PIN network, such as STAR and Accel (Fiserv), NYCE (FIS), or PULSE (Discover)
European Economic Area
The payer
Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2015/751: co-badging is allowed, and the payer chooses the application
Set a default priority on the terminal, without ever preventing the cardholder from choosing
India
The cardholder, when the card is issued
Reserve Bank of India circular in force since September 6, 2024: an end to exclusivity between an issuer and a network
Accept every network in the card base: routing is not decided at the point of sale
Indonesia
The regulator
GPN (Gerbang Pembayaran Nasional): domestic routing mandated by Bank Indonesia through four licensed switches
Check that the acquirer connects to the domestic switch, not just to the international brands
Malaysia
The regulator
MyDebit: mandatory domestic routing priority, migrated to the NextSwitch platform in 2025
Check on the statement the share of volume actually routed domestically
Who chooses the network, and what the merchant should ask for
Routing decisions turn on three variables. The first is the total cost of the transaction, network fees included. The second is the authorization rate, which varies from one network to another on the same cards and by time of day. The third is how fraud is handled, with the burden of proof and the dispute rules that come with it. The cheapest network is therefore not always the right one, and a test that measures only cost will always pick it. Lost approvals show up six months later, in a decline rate nobody connects to the routing change anymore. A 10-basis-point gain wiped out by one lost point of authorization rate is a net loss.
The switchover protocol, in six steps
Measure the baseline over four full weeks: total cost by brand, authorization rate by brand, fraud rate by brand.
Turn on the new routing for a representative subset: one region of stores, or one BIN range online.
Run the test for at least four weeks, with no other configuration change in that scope.
Compare all three variables before and after, on the same scope, not just the headline rate.
Read the brand mix on the following month’s statement: that is the proof the routing actually took effect.
Roll it out, then return the measurement to a quarterly cycle, because a rate schedule revision can reverse the trade-off.
Three written requests frame the whole process. The first asks for the routing rule actually applied, brand by brand and channel by channel. The second asks for the configured order of preference, with a list of exceptions and the reason for each. The third asks for the emergency failover procedure that applies when a network goes down at peak time. A verbal answer leaves no record, and it cannot be produced if the settings are disputed later.
⚠️
Routing is verified on the statement, not on a promise
The proof that routing was switched on is the split of volume by brand on the following month’s statement. A salesperson announcing the activation does not prove it: the announcement reports an intended configuration, while the statement records the volume actually routed. An unchanged mix after activation means the setting never made it down to the terminals. This is common with mixed terminal fleets, where some devices keep an old configuration that nobody updates anymore.
🎯 Quick question
An Australian merchant finds its debit acceptance cost has not moved after requesting least-cost routing. What should it look at first?
Chapter 5. Surcharging where allowed, steering everywhere else.
A surcharge is an extra amount a merchant charges a customer for paying with a particular instrument. It is one of three levers on the cost of acceptance. Steering shifts volume to a cheaper payment method, and a minimum amount keeps small purchases off an instrument whose fixed fee makes them unprofitable. Surcharging is banned in much of the world. Whether it is legal depends on the market, the card product, and sometimes the state where the customer lives, so check legality before running any numbers.
Market
Surcharging
Limit
Check before any rollout
European Economic Area
Banned on consumer cards with regulated interchange
Not applicable
Article 62(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366; the ban also covers SEPA credit transfers and direct debits
European Economic Area, commercial cards
Outside the scope of the ban
The cost actually incurred
National options: a member state may go further than the EU text
United States
Allowed on credit, banned on debit and prepaid
3% under Visa rules since April 15, 2023, 4% under Mastercard rules, never above the cost incurred
The law of the customer’s state, as several jurisdictions ban or restrict the practice; advance notice to the acquirer and the network
Australia
Allowed today, banned on designated networks from October 1, 2026
The cost of acceptance incurred, until the ban
The effective date: eftpos, Mastercard, and Visa are covered for debit, prepaid, and credit (RBA, Conclusions Paper, March 31, 2026)
India
Not applicable to zero-MDR instruments
Not applicable
There is nothing to pass on for RuPay debit and BHIM-UPI: the cost shifts to the gateway, the aggregator, and compliance
Surcharging rules, market by market
Never exceed the cost actually incurred on the surcharged instrument: the network cap is a ceiling, not a flat fee to apply.
Disclose the amount before the customer pays, on screen or in store, not at the confirmation step.
Show the surcharge as a separate line on the receipt and the invoice, so it remains identifiable if there is a refund.
Refund the surcharge pro rata on a partial refund, or the customer ends up paying a fee on a canceled sale.
Document how the cost incurred is calculated and update it with every rate schedule revision: this is the evidence a network asks for in an audit.
The cost of a surcharge shows up in the conversion rate, which it lowers. A customer who finds an extra fee on the last screen sometimes abandons the cart, and abandonment varies widely with the amount shown. Test on a sample before any rollout, with conversion rate as the output metric. The calculation weighs the fees saved against the margin lost on abandoned carts over the same period. A drop in conversion cuts revenue, and that loss appears nowhere on the payment invoice.
Steering without surcharging
🔀
Shifting volume to an account-to-account rail
Pix in Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil, 2020), UPI in India, PayNow in Singapore (Association of Banks in Singapore, 2017), DuitNow QR in Malaysia (PayNet, 2019), qvik in Hungary (MNB and GIRO Zrt., 2024). Their cost of acceptance is far lower than that of cards. Their dispute rules, however, have no generic equivalent. So the comparison must include customer service costs and the rate of unpaid transactions.
🥇
Reordering payment options at checkout
The first method displayed captures a disproportionate share of choices. Reordering the list costs nothing, is reversible, and can be measured within a week. In the European Economic Area, Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 allows merchants to steer and inform the payer.
💳
Choosing the default payment method
An instrument saved as the default sets the cost of every subsequent purchase. That default is a pricing decision, yet it is usually made without consulting the finance team.
🎯
Setting a minimum amount
Excluding an expensive instrument below a minimum amount remains lawful in many markets, subject to network rules and local law. Base the calculation on unit cost, not the rate, because a fixed fee weighs more heavily the smaller the purchase.
ℹ️
Local law sometimes restricts what network rules allow
Networks publish acceptance rules that set the conditions under which merchants may accept their cards. Visa publishes its Visa Core Rules and Visa Product and Service Rules, along with a dedicated document on merchant surcharging (visa.com, accessed in 2026). These rules do not override any local obligation. Consumer law, tax law, and state or provincial law all apply on top, and any of them can restrict what a network allows. So check local law first, then the network rule.
🎯 Quick question
A merchant based in the European Economic Area wants to surcharge consumer credit card payments. What does its payments manager tell it?
Chapter 6. Negotiating with numbers.
An acquiring negotiation means getting several bidders to price the same transaction file. Timing matters as much as the numbers. An acquirer approached three weeks before the contract renewal knows no migration can happen in that window. Leverage depends neither on the volume processed nor on the quality of the relationship. It rests on having a credible alternative, and that credibility comes from a timeline that leaves room to migrate. Twelve weeks is enough, provided the cost base already exists and does not have to be built in a rush.
Weeks 1–2
Cost base
A 12-month transaction-level extract, effective MDR overall and by segment, cost of declines and disputes.
Interchange++ billing: actual interchange, actual scheme fees, and contractual margin, each on its own line
An invoice where a network increase and a margin increase look identical
Pass-through of reductions
Any reduction in a legal cap or a network schedule is passed through in full on its effective date, with no amendment needed
A regulatory saving that stops at the acquirer
Notice of increases
Any network fee increase is notified 60 days in advance, backed by the network’s own documentation
A silent increase booked to an unverifiable line item
Fixed margin
The margin is stated in basis points and as a fixed amount, independent of changes in the other two layers
A margin expressed as a share of the total, which grows automatically with interchange
Volume tiers
A margin grid by annual tier, applied automatically once a threshold is crossed
An announced discount that only materializes through renegotiation
Data provision
Monthly transaction-level extract in a machine-readable format, including country of issue and card product
No way to verify anything after signing
Portability
Card token portability, mandate export, a capped notice period, and no exit fees on data
A migration that forces every stored-card customer to re-enter their card
Pricing audit
The right to have billing checked by a third party once a year, with access to the label mapping table
A billing disagreement with no way to resolve it
Eight clauses to write, and what each one prevents
Putting a number on the ask
Expected annual gain, and what to subtract from it
INPUT DATA
V = annual volume processed
M = measured effective MDR, in basis points
M' = effective MDR of the competing offer, priced ON THE SAME FILE
GROSS ANNUAL GAIN = V x (M - M') / 10,000
Illustrative example: V = 40,000,000; M = 118 bp; M' = 104 bp
gross annual gain = 40,000,000 x 14 / 10,000 = 56,000
SUBTRACT BEFORE DECIDING
technical switchover cost .......... integration, testing, re-tokenization
conversion loss .................... during the ramp-up period
internal project cost .............. person-days x loaded cost
exit fees and notice ............... remaining contract term
TAKEAWAY: a gap of a few basis points generally does not pay for a
migration. It pays for a renegotiation, which is not the same project or
the same risk. The number does not tell you what to do; it tells you which
project gets funded.
Effective MDR over the past 12 months, in basis points, with the calculation method spelled out.
The mix by card product, showing the share of volume outside every cap.
The inter-regional share, which measures exposure to the highest rate schedules.
Unit authorization cost multiplied by the number of attempts, declines included.
Annual cost of disputes, including cases won.
Projected volume over three years, with the growth assumption stated: this is the number that buys you the tiers.
🔑
A quote that has not been run on your data is worthless
A quoted rate describes a theoretical mix, not that of the merchant running the RFP. So the RFP requires every bidder to price the same simulation file, with the same segments, volumes, and countries of issue. The merchant then recalculates each offer on its actual 12 months, without relying on the totals the bidder provides. The gap between the quoted rate and the actual cost then comes to light before signing, not on the first statement.
Price monitoring continues after signing. Every quarter it repeats the same metrics, with the same method, on the same extract, and comes down to three checks. The first measures drift in scheme fees, in basis points. The second checks that regulatory reductions were passed through on their effective date. The third looks at the mix, whose evolution can make the pricing grid obsolete. A gap caught within the quarter gets fixed by amendment; the same gap discovered at contract renewal will have been paid for three years.
🎯 Quick question
Why require every bidder to price the same simulation file?